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THE FOREIGN TAX CREDIT FOR AMERICAN OIL
CONTRACTORS IN INDONESIA: AN ALLOCATION APPROACH
The Internal Revenue Code subjects American corporations to federal
income taxation on all income from foreign sources' but allows the cor-
porate taxpayer a credit for income taxes paid to foreign governments.
2
Subject to certain maximum limitations3 on this foreign tax credit, the
American corporate taxpayer may offset its United States tax liability
by the amount of the foreign income tax on a dollar-for-dollar basis.,
However, this favorable tax treatment applies only to foreign levies
which qualify as a foreign income tax under the statutory requirements;
a levy which does not qualify is merely deductible.'
American oil companies have generally enjoyed favorable United
States tax treatment of foreign income derived from oil production,
because the Internal Revenue Service has upheld the creditability of
most of the income taxes imposed by the foreign host governments
which harbor the major international oil reserves! Since most host
1. I.R.C. § 11, as amended by Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 901(a),
90 Stat. 1606 (hereinafter all sections of the I.R.C. amended by the Tax Reform Act of
1976 are cited as if codified). For taxable years ending before January 1, 1978, corporate
income is taxed at 20 percent on the first $25,000 of taxable income, 22 percent on the
next $25,000, and 48 percent on taxable income in excess of $50,000. Id.
2. I.R.C. §§ 901, 903.
3. I.R.C. §§ 904, 907(a)-(b); Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 1035(c)(2),
90 Stat. 1631, reprinted in I.R.C. § 907 note. See notes 34-39 infra and accompanying text.
4. As an alternative to the credit, I.R.C. § 164(a)(3) provides that otherwise creditable
foreign income taxes may be treated as a deduction. Since the credit offers the more
favorable tax treatment, the deduction alternative is usually not elected unless the tax-
payer suffers foreign losses. See Comment, Operation of the Foreign Tax Credit in the
Petroleum Industry: A "Dry Hole"?, 15 VA. J. INT'L L. 421, 438 (1975). I.R.C. § 275(a)(4)
prohibits the deduction of income taxes for which credit treatment is elected. The Tax
Court has held that no part of any income tax for which a credit is claimed can be allowed
as a deduction. Mary A. Marsman, 18 T.C. 1, 16 (1952), rev'd on other grounds, 205 F.2d
335 (4th Cir.), rehearing denied per curiam, 205 F.2d 43 (4th Cir. 1953).
5. I.R.C. § 164(a)(3) allows a deduction for levies which qualify as foreign taxes; levies
which are not taxes but royalties paid to a foreign government as landowner may be
excluded from gross income, resulting in tax treatment equivalent to a deduction. See
I.R.C. § 613(a); Kirby Petroleum Co. v. Commissioner, 326 U.S. 599, 604 (1946); Helvering
v. Twin Bell Oil Syndicate, 293 U.S. 312 (1934). See also C. BREEDING & A. BUIlrON,
INco&ME TAxATION oF NATURAL REsouRcEs 813 (1971).
6. Rev. Rul. 69-338, 1969-2 C.B. 154 (Indonesia); Rev. Rul. 68-552, 1968-2 C.B. 306
(Libya); Rev. Rul. 55-296, 1955-1 C.B. 386 (Saudi Arabia); I.T. 4038, 1950-2 C.B. 54
(Venezuela); I.T. 4049, 1951-1 C.B. 32 (Canada). The IRS has also issued unpublished
private rulings which have allowed foreign tax credit treatment for the taxes on oil extrac-
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countries impose a higher income tax rate on oil companies than the
United States corporate tax rate, American corporations pay little or no
United States tax on this foreign income.'
Until recently, American oil companies operating under production-
sharing contracts in Indonesia' reaped the benefits of the foreign tax
credit.9 However, in 1976, the IRS ruled that these production-sharing
oil companies will no longer enjoy this favorable tax credit treatment.
In Revenue Ruling 76-215,'1 the contractual production-sharing obliga-
tion" of American contractors 2 to an Indonesian state enterprise 3 was
deemed ineligible for the foreign tax credit." The IRS characterized the
tion imposed by most'host countries. See Tannenbaum, Petition to Bar Credit for Oil
Royalty Payments, TAX NorES, Feb. 25, 1974, at 20, 22-23.
7. Hearings on the Multinational Petroleum Companies and Foreign Policy Before the
Subcomm. on Multinational Corporations of the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 93d
Cong., 2d Sess., ser. 5, pt. 4, at 12 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Multinationals].
8. Production-sharing contracts are a principal contractual method by which oil pro.
duction operations are conducted in Indonesia. In 1975, production-sharing operations
accounted for roughly 27 percent of total Indonesian oil production. Industry Becomes
Cautious in Southeast Asia, WoRLD Om, Aug. 15, 1976, at 190; Grant, Wealth of the Indies,
BARRONS, July 12, 1976, at 3. An increase in production-sharing output by one contractor
in the first six months of 1976 indicates that production-sharing contracts will account
for a higher percentage in 1976. See Wall St. J., Oct. 12, 1976, at 4, cols. 2-4.
9. Oil extraction under production-sharing contracts is also conducted in more than
fifteen other countries,' including Egypt, Libya, Nigeria, Lebanon, Jordan, Syria, South
Yemen, India, Bangladesh, Burma, Malaysia, Sri Lanka, Phillippines, Peru, Bolivia and
Uruguay. Nordberg & Kelleher, Production-Sharing Contracts and Foreign Tax Credit:
A Current Analysis, 45 J. TAx. 218, 219 n.2 (1976). Many of these countries have vigor-
ously insisted upon the production-sharing method; the terms of the contracts vary from
country to country. Id. at 218.
10. 1976-23 I.R.B. 6.
11. The production-sharing obligation is the share of the net production or "profit oil"
which the oil company must deliver to Indonesia under the terms of the production.
sharing contract. See notes 52-55 infra and accompanying text.
12. Production-sharing contracts denominate American oil companies as "contractors."
See note 46 infra.
13. The state enterprise, Pertamina, is wholly owned by the Indonesian government.
See note 41 infra.
14. Congress subsequently intervened to enact a provision which makes Rev. Rul. 76-
215 inapplicable to production-sharing contracts entered into before April 8, 1976 until
taxable years ending after 1977. Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 1035(c) (3),
90 Stat. 1631, reprinted in I.R.C. § 907 note. Consequently, American oil companies
operating under production-sharing contracts will not suffer an immediate increase in
United States tax liability. Moreover, the enactment leaves open the question of the
proper tax treatment for production-sharing obligations made in taxable years ending
after 1977, since the statutory language and legislative history indicate that Congress
intended to take no position on the correctness of the ruling but rather left to the courts
the task of determining the validity of the ruling's treatment of production-sharing obliga-
tions. See S. REP. No. 938, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 254 (1976).
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entire production-sharing obligation, which entitles Indonesia to the
lion's share of "profit oil,"" as a royalty, and concluded that this obliga-
tion does not constitute an "income tax" within the meaning of I.R.C.
§ 901."1 Following this ruling, the IRS issued an announcement, IR-
1638,11 which indicates that the criteria used to determine the creditabil-
ity of a foreign levy in Revenue Ruling 76-215 applies not only to
production-sharing contracts but to foreign levies on extraction income
generally. IR-1638 supplements Revenue Ruling 76-215 and clarifies the
requirments which a foreign levy must satisfy to be creditable.'
This Note will critically assess Revenue Ruling 76-215 on the basis of
established principles of federal income taxation." Attention will be
15. "Profit oil" is the oil remaining after the contractor has recovered his costs. See
notes 52-55 infra and accompanying text.
16. I.R.C. § 901. The ruling also denied a deduction for the production-sharing obliga-
tion, since the IRS deemed it to be a royalty paid for permission to extract minerals. As a
royalty, it is excludable from gross income. See note 5 supra; note 87 infra and accompany-
ing text.
17. [1976] 9 STAND. FED. TAX REP. (CCH) 6751 [hereinafter cited as IR-1638].
18. Because Rev. Rul. 76-215 imposes a higher "tax cost" upon production-sharing
operations, the ruling is likely to adversely affect future production-sharing activities in
Indonesia and other countries. A spokesman for Mobil Oil Corp. indicated that the ruling
is likely to upset plans for future American investments needed to continue the develop-
ment of Indonesian oil reserves. Wall St. J., April 16, 1976, at 7, cols. 2, 3. One contractor
claims that the ruling will cut its earnings from production-sharing contracts in half and
is prepared to contest its validity. Wall St. J., May 10, 1976, at 5, col. 1.
After the expiration of the brief grace period provided by Congress, currently operating
contractors can be expected to raise their import price in an attempt to maintain current
profit levels. This increase should have an impact upon the world energy market, since
Indonesia accounts for approximately 2.5 percent of the total world crude oil production.
COUNCIL ON INT'L ECONOMIC POLICY, EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, INTERNATIONAL
ECONoMic REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT 172 (1976) [hereinafter cited as INTERNATIONAL Eco-
NoMIc REPOrT].
In an effort to maintain their current rate of profitability at current price levels, the
contractors have negotiated with Pertamina for the revision of the terms of the production-
sharing contracts to satisfy the requirements of IR-1638 and allow the contractor foreign
tax credit treatment. In August, 1976, some contractors agreed to revised terms along the
lines of the "Original Terms of Reference" proposed by Indonesia. Letter from Piet
Haryono to contractors (August 1976) [hereinafter cited as Original Terms of Reference]
(on file at the offices of the Cornell International Law Journal). See Wall St. J., Aug. 3,
1976, at 6, col. 2; id., Aug. 9, 1976, at 26, col. 2. However, these new terms do not fully
satisfy the requirements of IR-1638. See notes 93 & 94 infra. Further negotiations can be
expected during the grace period, but Pertamina is not likely to agree to further new
terms which might reduce its much needed oil revenues. See notes 41 & 55 infra. If the
parties do not further modify the terms of the contracts along the lines of IR-1638, the
IRS can be expected to deny foreign tax credit for taxable years ending after 1977.
19. Because Rev. Rul. 76-215 imposes a higher rate of taxation on production-sharing
operations, the ruling has significant economic and energy policy ramifications. Some
commentators have urged that United States energy needs demand that American oil
1977]
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focused on the unique character of the production-sharing contract
which stems from Indonesia's dual role as foreign taxing authority and
landowner. An alternative method of tax treatment is proposed, under
which the production-sharing obligation is allocated into tax and royalty
portions. Finally, this Note suggests the application of a similar alloca-




The foreign tax credit is designed to eliminate the international dou-
ble taxation of income derived from foreign sources. 2 Because an Ameri-
can taxpayer's foreign income is usually taxed by the country where it
is earned and also by the United States, he is subject to income taxation
by two sovereigns. 21 In the absence of the credit, a taxpayer with foreign
income would incur a greater tax liability than would a taxpayer with a
similar amount of income from purely domestic sources. The foreign tax
credit eliminates this inequity and places taxpayers with foreign source
income in roughly the same position as taxpayers with only domestic
income. Thus, the foreign tax credit is consistent with a fundamental
principle of federal income taxation: taxpayers with equal taxable ca-
companies be taxed at a higher rate on foreign operations than on domestic operations.
G. BRANNON, ENERGY TAXES AND SuBsmiEs 102-04 (1974); Comment, supra note 4, at 448-
66. By encouraging increased investment in domestic oil production and research for
alternative sources of energy at home, higher taxation of foreign operations might reduce
the United States' reliance on foreign oil. Comment, supra note 4, at 449-50. The Nixon
and Ford administrations advocated such taxation in "Project Independence." Id.; see
Comment, The Impact of the Income Tax Laws on the Energy Crisis: Oil and Congress
Don't Mix, 64 CALF. L. REv. 1040, 1070 (1976). However, the achievement of this goal
requires consumers to pay a higher price on current foreign imports subjected to the higher
tax. Sensitive to consumer desires for energy price stability at current levels, Congress has
thus far refrained from enacting such legislation. A full evaluation of United States energy
policy is beyond the scope of this Note.
20. Congress originally enacted I.R.C. § 901 by the Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 18, § 238,
40 Stat. 1057, 1080 (1919), in order "to mitigate the evil of double taxation" on foreign
source income of American corporations. Burnet v. Chicago Portrait Co., 285 U.S. 1, 7
(1932). See E. OwENs, THE FOREIGN TAX CREDrr 295 (1961); cf. Equitable Life Assurance
Soc'y v. United States, 366 F.2d 967, 974 (Ct. Cl. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1021 (1967)
(rationale behind I.R.C. § 901 also underlies I.R.C. § 903).
21. Double international taxation most often arises because the foreign country claims
tax jurisdiction on the grounds that the income originated in the foreign country while
the United States asserts tax jurisdiction on the basis of the nationality of the recipient.
E. OwENs, supra note 20, at 295-96. By allowing the foreign tax credit, the United States
recognizes that primary jurisdiction to tax income rests with the country in which it is
earned. Jenks, Taxation of Foreign Income, 42 GEO. WASH. L. Rxv. 537, 550 (1974).
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pacity should bear an equal income tax burden."
Section 901 of the Internal Revenue Code, the cornerstone provision
of the foreign tax credit, states that an American corporation2 may elect
to credit against its United States taxes "the amount of any income
. . .taxes paid or accrued during the taxable year to any foreign coun-
try. 24 Since the credit is available only for foreign income taxes, a levy
exacted by a foreign government qualifies for favorable foreign tax
credit treatment only if it is a tax which is imposed on income. In apply-
ing these requirements, the courts have held that a foreign levy is
creditable if it is "the substantial equivalent of an 'income tax' as that
term is understood in the United States. '2 Although most cases26 have
22. E. OwENs, supra note 20, at 3. In the past, economists generally supported the
foreign tax credit, since it enabled American oil companies to maintain a competitive
position in the world energy market and fostered the desirable goal of United States
corporate investment in and control of international oil production. See Multinationals,
supra note 7, at 89. Recently, however, the advantages of United States corporate
"ownership" of foreign oil reserves have been questioned, and the foreign tax credit has
been attacked as encouraging high foreign taxation of American taxpayers' foreign in-
come. See Comment, supra note 4, at 429, 444-46. Various proposals have been advanced
for the elimination or modification of the foreign tax credit provisions. See HousE Comm.
oN WAYS AND MEANS, 93RD CONG., lST SESs., PANEL DIscussioNs ON GENERAL TAX REFORM,
pt. 11, at 1760-61 (Comm. Print 1973) (statement of Professor Peggy Musgrave); H.R.
2166, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., 121 CONG. Rac. S4299 (daily ed. Mar. 18, 1975). See Cox &
Wright, The Impact of the Tax Reduction Act of 1975 on the Petroleum Industry, 17 B.C.
INDus. & COM. L. REv. 805, 827 (1976). Congress, however, has refused to alter the basic
structure of the foreign tax credit. With the exception of I.R.C. § 901(f), recent legislative
modifications have affected only the limitation provisions. See notes 34-39 & 115 infra and
accompanying text. See generally Comment, supra note 19, at 1065-70. The retention of
the credit would seem to constitute Congressional recognition of its importance for inter-
national tax neutrality and the financial security of multinational oil companies. Id. at
1070. This Note will assume the general economic validity of the foreign tax credit provi-
sions.
23. I.R.C. §§ 951-954 prevent American oil companies from avoiding tax liability by
conducting foreign operations in the form of a controlled foreign subsidiary. Although the
subsidiary might attempt to postpone tax liability by reinvesting its foreign profits in the
foreign country rather than repatriating the profits to its American parent, I.R.C. § 951
provides that certain categories of income earned by the foreign subsidiary are included
in the gross income of its shareholder, i.e. the parent, regardless of whether it is repa-
triated. One such category is foreign base company sales income, I.R.C. § 954(a)(2), which
covers most oil production activities by controlled foreign subsidiaries. Comment, supra
note 19, at 1065 n.154. But see I.R.C. § 954(b)(4) (exempting from I.R.C. §§ 951-954
income earned by a foreign subsidiary which does not have "as one of its significant
purposes a substantial reduction of income... taxes"). See Comment, supra note 19, at
1065 n.154.
24. I.R.C. § 901(b). The statute also allows a credit for foreign "war profits and excess
profits taxes paid or accrued." I.R.C. § 901(b)(1). Decisional law construing these two
terms for foreign tax credit purposes is sparse. See E. OWENS, supra note 20, at 69.
25. New York & Honduras Rosario Mining Co. v. Commissioner, 168 F.2d 745, 747 (2d
1977]
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allowed credit only where the foreign tax base roughly approximated
taxable income under United States principles of federal income taxa-
tion,2 a recent decision = suggests that the foreign tax credit is avail-
able for every foreign tax imposed with an eye toward reaching the tax-
payer's net gain.
2
In addition to the credit for foreign income taxes, section 903 of the
Code" allows credit for foreign taxes paid "in lieu" of a general income
tax. Prior to the enactment of this provision in 1942, the IRS had inter-
preted section 901 as permitting credit only for foreign taxes which
Cir. 1948). Because foreign tax schemes seldom match the complexity of the Internal
Revenue Code, and because courts often find it difficult to unravel foreign tax systems, a
precise equivalent of the United States income tax is not required under I.R.C. § 901.
Comment, supra note 4, at 426.
26. Commissioner v. American Metal Co., 221 F.2d 134 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S.
829 (1955) (credit denied for Mexican tax on gross proceeds from mining operations);
Keasbey & Mattison Co. v. Rothensies, 133 F.2d 894 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 739
(1943) (Canadian tax upon gross value of output from mining operations held not credit-
able); St. Paul Fire and Marine Ins. Co. v. Reynolds, 44 F. Supp. 863 (D. Minn. 1942)
(credit denied for Canadian net premium tax on insurance companies). After an exhaus.
tive examination of the pre-1961 cases and revenue rulings on the creditability of taxes
imposed on general business receipts, one commentator concludes that credit is allowed
under I.R.C. § 901 only where "the [foreign] tax base is net income either in the sense
that deductions approximately the same as those under United States law are allowed or
in the sense that the foreign tax base is estimated net income." E. OWENs, supra note 20,
at 52. See generally id. at 33-54.
27. Credit has also been denied on the ground that the foreign tax is a "privilege tax,"
that is, a tax levied on the privilege of extracting minerals belonging to the foreign sover-
eign. Commissioner v. American Metal Co., 221 F.2d 134 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S.
829 (1955). Contra, New York & Honduras Rosario Mining Co. v. Commissioner, 168 F.2d
745 (2d Cir. 1948). However, American Metal suggests that this treatment is confined to
additional taxes whose features differ substantially from the general income tax. See 221
F.2d at 137-40.
28. Bank of America National Trust & Say. Ass'n v. United States, 459 F.2d 513, 524
(Ct.Cl. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 949 (1973). The court allowed foreign tax credit
treatment for a tax on gross income on the grounds that it was highly unlikely that the
tax would be imposed on any taxpayer when his activities were unprofitable. See note 92
infra and accompanying text.
29. The Supreme Court has ruled that a foreign sovereign's classification of a levy as
an "income tax" does not determine the tax treatment under I.R.C. § 901. Biddle v.
Commissioner, 302 U.S. 573, 578-79 (1938). Similarly, the denomination of a levy by a
term other than "income tax" should not bear on its eligibility for the foreign tax credit.
See New York & Honduras Rosario Mining Co. v. Commissioner, 168 F.2d 745 (2d Cir.
1948) (contractual obligation to pay 7 percent of mining profits to foreign government held
to be creditable foreign tax).
30. I.R.C. § 903 provides:
For the purposes of this subpart and of sections 164(a) and 275(a), the term
"income, war profits, and excess profits taxes" shall include a tax paid in lieu of
a tax on income, war profits, or excess profits otherwise generally imposed by any
foreign country or by any possession of the United States.
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closely approximated the American income taxation scheme.3 Congress
intended section 903 to enlarge the range of creditable taxes and provide
credit treatment for taxes which a foreign country substituted for a
general income tax.2 However, the IRS has narrowly interpreted section
903 to allow credit treatment only when the taxpayer pays a special tax
which a foreign government imposes in complete substitution for a gen-
eral foreign income tax to which the taxpayer would otherwise be sub-
ject.
3
Current Code provisions place a ceiling on the amount of foreign taxes
which may be credited. Section 907(a)31 provides that a credit will not
be allowed for the amount by which foreign income taxes exceed the
product of oil and gas extraction income= multiplied by the United
States corporate tax rate.3 In addition, section 1035(c)(2) of the Tax
31. S. REP. No. 1631, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 131-32 (1942).
32. Id. The report specifically mentions certain types of non-income taxes-such as
taxes imposed on gross income, gross sales, or number of units produced-which are
creditable under I.R.C. § 903 when imposed in substitution for a general income tax.
33. Treas. Reg. § 1.903-1(a), T.D. 6780, 1965-1 C.B. 96, 105 provides:
[T]he term "income, war profits, and excess profits taxes" includes a tax
imposed by statute or decree by a foreign country or by a possession of the United
States if-
(1) Such country or possession has in force a general income tax law,
(2) The taxpayer claiming the credit would, in the absence of a specific
provision applicable to such taxpayer, be subject to such general income
tax, and
(3) Such general income tax is not imposed upon the taxpayer thus
subject to such substituted tax.
The courts have upheld these requirements and denied credit for taxes imposed in addi-
tion to rather than in substitution for a general income tax. Allstate Ins. Co. v. United
States, 419 F.2d 409 (Ct. Cl. 1969) (gross premiums tax on stock casualty insurance
corporations); Abbott Laboratories Int'l Co. v. United States, 160 F. Supp. 321, 331 (N.D.
Ill. 1958), aff'd per curiam, 267 F.2d 940 (7th Cir. 1959) (Columbian patrimony tax).
However, a substituted tax which satisfies the regulations is creditable regardless of
whether it seeks to reach the taxpayer's net gain. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. United
States, 375 F.2d 835, 838-39 (Ct. Cl. 1967). Nor must "in lieu" taxes be imposed to relieve
the "administrative difficulty" of collecting a general income tax, as the IRS has con-
tended. 375 F.2d at 838. See S. REP. No. 1631, 77th Cong., 2d Seass. 131-32 (1942).
34. I.R.C. § 907(a).
35. I.R.C. § 907(c)(1) defines foreign oil and gas extraction income as income derived
from the extraction of minerals from oil or gas wells outside of the United States or from
the sale or exchange of assets used in extraction operations.
36. I.R.C. 99 904(a), 907(b) contain an additional "overall limitation" on credit allow-
able on foreign oil related income, which I.R.C. § 907(c)(2) defines to include foreign
extraction income as well as income from processing, transportation, and distribution
operations. See S. REP. No. 938, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 250-51 (1976). I.R.C. § 904(a)
subjects all taxpayers to the overall limitation, which provides that the total amount of
credit shall not exceed the proportion of total United States income tax (before allowance
for the foreign tax credit which the taxable income from foreign sources bears to total
1977]
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Reform Act of 197637 places a special restriction on income taxes paid
under production-sharing contracts, whereby credit is limited to 48 per-
cent of the extraction income derived from these contracts alone, with-
out regard for the taxpayer's total worldwide extraction income." These
provisions prevent an American oil company from using excess foreign
tax credits generated by production-sharing operations to offset its
United States tax liability on other foreign income. 9
taxable income. I.R.C. § 904(a). Mathematically, the limitation may be expressed as
follows:
Credit Foreign Income
Total Tax Total Income
Comment, supra note 4, at 431 & n.58. I.R.C. § 907(b) requires corporate taxpayers to
calculate the foreign tax credit allowable under this overall limitation separately for
foreign oil related income and other taxable income.
37. Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 1035(c)(2), 90 Stat. 1631, reprinted
in I.R.C. § 907 note.
38. The Senate Report explains the relationship of § 1035(c)(2) of the Tax Reform Act
and I.R.C. § 907(a) as follows:
[T]he total amount treated as creditable taxes under this provision is not to
exceed the lesser of two amounts. The first amount is the total foreign oil and gas
extraction income with respect to production-sharing contracts covered under the
rule multiplied by the U.S. corporate tax rate (generally 48 percent) less the
otherwise allowable (if any) foreign tax credits attributable to income from those
contracts. The second amount is the total foreign oil and gas extraction income
multiplied by the U.S. corporate tax rate (generally 48 percent) less the total
amount of the otherwise allowable foreign tax credits (if any) attributable to the
total foreign oil and gas extraction income.
S. REP. No. 938, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 254 (1976). The Report then gives an example of
the tax treatment for a taxpayer with the following income and foreign taxes:
Source of foreign extraction income
Production-sharing contracts 10
Other extraction operations 90
Total extraction income 100
Foreign income taxes
Production-sharing contracts 45
Other extraction operations 6
Total foreign income taxes 51
The taxpayer is allowed a credit for the production-sharing obligation equal to the lesser
of (48 percent of $10) or [(48 percent of $100) less $45], namely $3. Id. at 254-55.
39. See Cox & Wright, supra note 22, at 827. After the expiration of the brief grace
period provided by Congress, see note 14 supra, I.R.C. § 907(a) will impose a much heavier
tax burden on the smaller contractors operating exclusively under production-sharing
contracts, while the larger multinationals will be left unscathed. The multinationals will
be able to use excess foreign tax credits generated by their worldwide extraction operations
[Vol. 10:307
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II
IRS TREATMENT OF INDONESIAN PRODUCTION-SHARING
CONTRACTS
A. THE PRODUCTION-SHARING CONTRACT
Under Indonesian law, the Indonesian government holds the title to
all oil and gas within the country," and Pertamina," a state enterprise,
controls the exclusive right to develop and produce these minerals.2
Pertamina in turn is authorized to enter into contracts with foreign oil
companies for the development and extraction of oil and gas.4 However,
Pertamina may not transfer ownership of the minerals in place to thE
foreign contractor, and both Pertamina and the Indonesian government
are required by law to exercise a certain degree of control and supervi-
sion over the production operations."
to offset their United States tax liability for production-sharing income. The smaller
contractors, however, do not have these excess credits and must pay a greater proportion
of United States tax. This unfortunate result suggests that Congress should further extend
the grace period if the smaller contractors and Pertamina are not able to agree to revised
terms which qualify for the foreign tax credit under the IRS's restrictive interpretation of
I.R.C. § 901. See note 18 supra, and notes 93 & 94 infra and accompanying text.
40. UNDANG-UNDANG DASAR (Constitution) art. 33(3) (Indonesia 1945, reinstated 1957).
41. Pertamina was created by PERTAmiNA LAw, Law No. 8, [1971] Lembaron Negara
[LN] (1971), reprinted in R. FABmRKA, The Indonesian Petroleum Industry, Miscella-
neous Source Material, in 2 On. DiscovERY AND TcHNiCAc CHANGE IN SOUTHEAST AsIA 284
(1973). Pertamina replaced P.N. Pertamina, a prior state petroleum enterprise established
by a 1961 enactment designed to secure greater government control over petroleum opera-
tions of foreign oil companies. Although Pertamina is wholly owned by the Indonesian
government, its officers are businessmen not government bureaucreats, and manage its
affairs without close government supervision. Recently, however, Pertamina's officers
have badly mismanaged its international financial investments, resulting in staggering
losses and a long-term debt of over ten billion dollars. The government has reacted to this
mismanagement by replacing Pertamina's officers and increasing its direct control of
Pertamina's financial affairs. See Fabrikant, Pertamina: A Legal and Financial Analysis
of a National Oil Company in a Developing Country, 10 TEx. INT'L L.J. 495, 535-36 (1975)
[hereinafter cited as Pertamina Analysis]; Grant, Wealth of the Indies, BARRONS, July
12, 1976, at 3; BusiNEss WEEK, May 3, 1976, at 58-59.
42. PERTAMINA LAW, Law No. 8, art. 11(1), [1971] LN (1971).
43. PERTAMINA LAw, Law No. 8, art. 12(1), [1971] LN (1971).
44. Id. arts. 12(2)-(3). Before 1960, Indonesian oil production was conducted under
traditional concession contracts whereby the foreign concessionaire acquired title to min-
erals in place and exercised exclusive control over all oil production operations. Reacting
to this foreign domination, Indonesia enacted, in 1960, restrictive regulatory legislation
aimed at regaining Indonesian sovereignty over its natural resources. UNDANG-UNDANG
DASAR (Consitution) art. 33(3) (Indonesia 1945, reinstated 1957). Extensive governmental
supervision of the petroleum industry made investment in Indonesia unattractive for
foreign oil companies, many of which abandoned their Indonesian operations. The disfavor
with which foreign oil companies received this restrictive legislation distressed Indonesian
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The production-sharing contract is the agreement between the for-
eign"5 contractor" and Pertamina which stipulates the terms under
which the extraction operations will be carried out. The contract 7 pro-
vides that the contractor must pay Pertamina an initial signature bo-
nus, invest a minimum amount in exploration activities in the contract
area, and pay all expenses incurred in exploration and production. 8 To
recover its expenses, the contractor must look solely to the extraction
of oil and gas, from which it is entitled to recover its costs in barrels of
government officials who, in addition to desiring governmental control over Indonesian
mineral resources, wished to restore the crumbling Indonesian economy through the injec-
tion of foreign capital. In order to secure a financial arrangement which would assure
foreign operators substantial and continuing profits without excessive governmental inter-
ference and, at the same time, allow Indonesian supervision of oil production operations,
the Indonesian Parliament enacted the less regulatory legislation which is presently in
force. Subsequent negotiations between Pertamina and foreign operators developed the
production-sharing contract. Under the management clause of this arrangement, Perta-
mina has the contractual right to revise the contractor's budget and work program. How-
ever, since Pertamina's substantial influence in Indonesian politics depends largely on
maintaining the contractor's goodwill, Pertamina has exercised this right sparingly. As a
result, the contractor exercises actual control of development and production operations,
although the specter of possible governmental supervision no doubt influences its manage-
ment decisions. See generally Fabrikant, Production Sharing Contracts in the Indonesian
Petroleum Industry, 16 HARv. INT'L L.J. 303, 307-17, 327, 330 (1975) [hereinafter cited as
Indonesian Pertroleum Industry].
45. Although American contractors account for the bulk of production-sharing opera-
tions, contracts are also held by French, Japanese and Canadian contractors. See Grant,
supra note 41, at 3, col. 4. To the extent that the American contractors are adversely
affected by Rev. Rul. 76-215, these other foreign contractors enjoy a relative advantage
over their American competitors.
46. Production-sharing contracts denominate the contracting oil company as contrac-
tor, perhaps because this term implies that foreign oil companies no longer dominate the
Indonesian petroleum industry as "concessionaires" ' but have been reduced to a subordi-
nate position, in accordance with Indonesia's nationalistic goals. See note 44 supra.
47. All Indonesian production-sharing contracts are substantially similar in their essen-
tial terms and provisions. See generally Indonesian Petroleum Industry, supra note 44, at
312, 321-30. The specific terms discussed in the text are those contained in the contract
which Rev. Rul. 76-215 addresses. However, the terms of the Rev. Rul. 76-215 contract
are not binding upon the contractor and Pertamina, as this contract was only proposed
but not signed at the time of the ruling. Letter from John Clark to William P. McClure
(April 7, 1976) (on file at the offices of the Cornell International Law Journal). Conse-
quently, the contractor, Mobil Oil Indonesia, may negotiate with Pertamina to revise the
contractual terms along the lines of IR-1638 before Mobil begins production. See note 18
supra.
48. Rev. Rul. 76-215, 1976-23 I.R.B. 6, 7. A unique feature of the production-sharing
contract is the provision which vests title in Indonesia to all the equipment used by the
contractor when landed at an Indonesian port. Indonesian Petroleum Industry, supra note
44, at 331. The contractor may recover his expenditures toward this equipment in "cost
oil."
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oil, or "cost oil."49 The recovery for each contract year is limited to 40
percent of the value of all barrels of oil produced; costs in excess of 40
percent of total gross production may be carried forward and recouped
in subsequent years." Cost recovery is computed separately under each
contract held by the contractor, so that the contractor may not recover
expenses or losses incurred under a non-producing contract. 1
The remaining 60 percent of the oil is "profit oil" and is divided
between the contractor and Pertamina.2 Pursuant to the contract, the
contractor is entitled to 30 percent of the profit oil and must deliver to
Pertamina the remaining 70 percent as its production-sharing obliga-
tion.-3 Pertamina is then required by law54 to deposit into the Indonesian
Treasury the equivalent of 60 percent of the total profit oil. 5
After stating that the contractor remains subject to certain Indone-
sian taxes, including the Corporation Tax, 6 the production-sharing con-
49. Rev. Rul. 76-215, 1976-23 I.R.B. 6, 7. The contract does not allow recovery for the
amount paid as a signature bonus, nor for interest paid on money borrowed for the
contractor's operations, nor for the "production bonus," a cash obligation which the con-
tractor incurs after production reaches a certain level. See Indonesian Petroleum Industry,
supra note 44, at 322-23.
50. Rev. Rul. 76-215, 1976-23 I.R.B. 6, 7.
51. Id. at 7.
52. Nordberg & Kelleher, supra note 9, at 218. One significant feature of the typical
production-sharing contract, the "domestic obligation," is not mentioned in Rev. Rul. 76-
215, either because the contract did not contain a domestic obligation provision or because
the IRS deemed this feature immaterial to tax treatment of the production-sharing obliga-
tion. Generally, the domestic obligation requires the contractor to sell to Pertamina, at
a nominal price, roughtly 20 percent of gross production remaining after cost oil is re-
covered but before the division of the profit oil at the negotiated percentages. Nordberg
& Kelleher, supra note 9, at 218, col. 2.
53. Rev. Rul. 76-215, 1976-23 I.R.B. 6, 7.
54. PERTAMINA LAw, Law No. 8, art. 14(1)(b), [1971] LN (1971).
55. Rev. Rul. 76-215, 1976-23 I.R.B. 6, 7. After recovery of expenditures, the contractor
receives 30 percent of the profit oil, and the Indonesian government and Pertamina,
respectively, receive 60 percent and 10 percent. Recently, the Indonesian government
compelled all production-sharing contractors to "renegotiate" their contracts, so that
Indonesia is now entitled to 85 percent of the profit oil and the contractor 15 percent. Wall
St. J., Aug. 3, 1976, at 6, col. 2; id. Aug. 8, 1976, at 26, col. 2. By increasing the govern-
ment's share, Indonesian officials hope to increase total revenues from foreign oil pro-
ducers and discharge the government's liability on the debts incurred by Pertamina.
Grant, supra note 41, at 3. The Indonesian Treasury will most likely receive the entire
amount of this additional profit oil; Pertamina will be only indirectly benefited by dis-
charge of its debts.
56. The Corporation Tax imposes a general income tax of 56 percent on foreign enter-
prises operating in Indonesia. Rev. Rul. 69-388, 1969-2 C.B. 154. The other taxes imposed
on the contractor include a transfer tax, import and export duties, and other levies relating
to the contractor's property, capital, net worth, operations, remittances, and transactions.
Rev. Rul. 76-215, 1976-23 I.R.B. 6, 7.
19771
Cornell International Law Journal
tract provides that Pertamina is obligated to discharge the contractor's
liability for these taxes." However, Article 15 of the Pertamina Law8
states that Pertamina's deposit into the Indonesian Treasury of the 60
percent share of the profit oil shall "discharge [Pertamina] and [the]
Contractor from and constitute payment of" these taxes. 9 Thus, the
contractual provision requiring Pertamina to discharge the contractor's
tax liabilities becomes superfluous upon the Indoesian Treasury's re-
ceipt of the amount to which it is entitled. The inclusion of this dis-
charge provision seems to stem from the contractor's desire to avoid tax
liability to the Indonesian government if Pertamina fails to make the
required deposit."
B. REvENUE RULING 76-215
In Revenue Ruling 76-2156l the IRS determined that the 70 percent
share which the contractor must deliver to Pertamina is a royalty paid
for permission to extract minerals which are the property of the Indone-
sian government. Since sections 901 and 903 restrict the foreign tax
credit to taxes, the IRS disallowed credit for the production-sharing
obligation.
In analyzing the production-sharing obligation, the IRS focused on
three features which it found characteristic of a royalty rather than a
57. Rev. Rul. 76-215, 1976-23 I.R.B. 6, 7. For the purposes of the Corporation Tax, the
contract states that the contractor's taxable income is the amount received from disposing
of his 30 percent share of profit oil plus an amount equal to the Corporation Tax thereon.
58. PERTAMINA LAw, Law No. 8, art. 15, [1971] LN (1971).
59. The word "exempt" appeared in the original English translation instead of
"discharge." Contractors objected to the former version on the grounds that they might
not obtain foreign tax credit treatment for their production-sharing obligations under
I.R.C. § 903 unless this obligation "discharged" them from Corporation Tax liability.
Indonesian Petroleum Industry, supra note 44, at 328 n.50.
60. In the event of Pertamina's default, this contractual provision might not discharge
the contractor from the Corporation Tax, since Pertamina is not legally empowered to
relieve the contractor of tax liability imposed on him by the Indonesian Parliament. See
id. at 326-29.
61. Rev. Rul. 76-215, 1976-23 I.R.B. 6. This public ruling was issued after the IRS
denied foreign tax credit treatment in a private ruling which one contractor, Mobil Oil
Indonesia, sought in accordance with Rev. Proc. 72-3, 1972-1 C.B. 698, and Rev. Rul. 67-
308, 1967-2 C.B. 254. Letter from John Clark to William P. McClure (April 7, 1976) (on
file at the offices of the Cornell International Law Journal). See Nordberg & Kelleher,
supra note 9, at 219, col. 2. Although Rev. Rul. 76-215 addresses the creditability of a
particular Indonesian production-sharing contract, the ruling indicates that all American
oil companies operating under production-sharing contracts in Indonesia can expect simi-
lar tax treatment. See note 47 supra. Production-sharing obligations levied by other coun-
tries will require independent examination under I.R.C. §§ 901, 903; however, the princi-
ples of analysis developed in this Note should serve as a model for the tax treatment of
all varieties of production-sharing contracts. See note 9 supra.
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tax. First, the IRS held that the contractor's entire obligation comes
within the basic definition of a private royalty62 under case law: a fixed
percentage of production, or a payment received by a person with an
"economic interest" in the minerals which is (1) based on production;
(2) for permitting another to extract the minerals; and (3) payable only
from the minerals produced or the proceeds from their disposition.1
3
Second, Revenue Ruling 76-215 focused on two provisions of the
production-sharing contract which limit the contractor's recovery of
expenses to 40 percent of annual production and entitle the government
to separately computed amounts of production under each production-
sharing contract held by the contractor. The IRS reasoned that these
provisions also are characteristic of a royalty because they guarantee
Indonesia a share of production without regard for the profitability of
the contractor's operations.64
The third aspect of the contract which the IRS relied upon is the
provision which specifies that title to Indonesia's 70 percent share of the
"profit oil" remains with Indonesia. Emphasizing that a levy is not a
tax unless paid out of assets owned by the contractor, the IRS found that
the production-sharing obligation does not qualify as a tax because the
contractor never acquired title to this 70 percent share. 5 The IRS rea-
soned that this non-tax feature buttressed its conclusion that the entire
obligation is characteristic of a royalty.
I
ANALYSIS
Implicit in Revenue Ruling 76-215 is the assumption that the
production-sharing obligation constitutes either a royalty or a tax in its
entirety. Consequently, the IRS has embraced an analytical approach
which classifies each particular levy imposed by a foreign government
into one of the two categories, depending upon its primary character."
This approach ignores the possibility that a single levy might be im-
posed partly as a tax and partly as a royalty, and that apportionment
62. A private royalty, paid to a private landowner to compensate him for the extraction
of his minerals, is to be distinguished from a royalty paid to a government/landowner with
taxing authority.
63. 1976-23 I.R.B. 6, 8, citing Burton-Sutton Oil Co. v. Commissioner, 328 U.S. 25
(1946); Kirby Petroleum Co. v. Commissioner, 326 U.S. 599 (1946); Cox v. United States,
497 F.2d 348 (4th Cir. 1974); Logan Coal & Timber Ass'n v. Helvering, 122 F.2d 848 (3d
Cir. 1941); United States Steel Corp. v. United States, 270 F. Supp. 253 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
64. 1976-23 I.R.B. 6, 8.
65. Id.
66. See E. OWENS, supra note 20, at 61-62; Comment, supra note 4, at 447.
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of a single levy into tax and royalty portions might be proper. This rigid,
"black or white," "tax or no tax" approach is open to serious criticism.
The following examination of the production-sharing obligation will
focus on two issues: first, whether this levy actually constitutes a tax,
in whole or in part-the "tax-royalty" issue; and second, if so, whether
that tax is imposed on income or imposed in lieu of a tax on income-the
"imposed-on-income" issue. It will be argued that the obligation is
partly a tax and partly a royalty, and that the tax portion is creditable
under section 903.
A. THE PRODUCTION-SHARING OBLIGATION AS A TAX AND A ROYALTY
The fundamental flaw in Revenue Ruling 76-215 is the IRS's failure
to recognize the Indonesian government's dual role. As taxing authority
and landowner, the government has the option to collect revenues either
in its capacity as a sovereign exercising its rights of taxation, or as an
ordinary owner of mineral rights collecting royalties for permitting their
extraction, or as both."7 In exacting production-sharing obligations, how-
ever, Indonesia"5 has not specified which revenue-collecting power it
exercises. This silence is not surprising, since Indonesia is more con-
cerned with actually obtaining oil revenues than with the precise legal
basis for their receipt. Given the unclear basis on which Indonesia has
exacted the production-sharing levy from the contractor, the IRS should
be hesitant to classify the entire levy as tax or royalty unless the features
of the obligation clearly indicate that it is exacted solely on the basis of
either the sovereign's taxing power or landowner rights. A close exami-
nation of the production-sharing obligation reveals that Indonesia im-
poses this single levy in a simultaneous exercise of its taxing authority
and landowner rights.
1. The IRS Analysis
None of the three features on which the IRS relied support the holding
of Revenue Ruling 76-215; each feature is equally characteristic of a
landowner's royalty as it is characteristic of a levy imposed by a foreign
67. See E. OWENS, supra note 20, at 32-33; Tannenbaum, supra note 6, at 27; Com-
ment, supra note 4, at 447.
68. The Indonesian government's ownership of the corporate assets of Pertamina cre-
ates a financial interrelationship between the government and the corporation which
makes it appropriate to refer to the entire production-sharing obligation as being received
by "Indonesia." See note 83 infra. Moreover, the Tax Reform Act of 1976 evidences
legislative intent to treat payments made to an entity owned by a foreign government in
the same manner as payments made directly to the foreign government. Tax Reform Act
of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 1035(c)(3), 90 Stat. 1631, reprinted in I.R.C. § 907 note.
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sovereign exercising its rights of taxation. First, the cases69 upon which
the IRS relied as defining a private royalty do not apply to the Indone-
sian production-sharing obligation. These cases concerned payments to
private landowners in exchange for mineral rights; the disputed issue
was not whether the obligation was eligible for the foreign tax credit, but
whether a particular taxpayer had a sufficient economic interest in the
minerals in place in order to qualify for the percentage depletion allow-
ance." Absent from these cases was the essential feature of the Indone-
sian production-sharing situation: the dual role of the recipient as tax-
ing sovereign and royalty-collecting landowner.7 Moreover, the ruling is
contrary to case law72 which has held government-imposed levies pos-
sessing royalty features to be creditable. 3
69. See note 63 supra.
70. I.R.C. § 613(a) allows a percentage depletion deduction for a specified portion of
the gross income which a taxpayer generates from oil-producing property and retains after
making payments for rent or royalties. The Supreme Court has interpreted this provision
to allow the depletion deduction to all taxpayers who hold an "economic interest" in
minerals in place. Palmer v. Bender, 287 U.S. 551 (1933); Burton-Sutton Oil Co. v.
Commissioner, 328 U.S. 25 (1946); Kirby Petroleum Co. v. Commissioner, 326 U.S. 599
(1946). An "economic interest" is defined as any interest in the minerals which gives its
holder a right to profits which is "dependent solely upon the extraction and sale of the
oil," 326 U.S. at 604 (footnote omitted), and therefore includes any royalty interest.
Consequently, the economic interest concept includes not only fee interests in minerals
but also royalty and net profit interests, and has been developed to provide, for any one
mineral deposit, only a single depletion allowance, equitably apportioned between the
holders of the economic interests. I.R.C. § 611(b)(1); see Burton-Sutton Oil Co. v. Com-
missioner, 328 U.S. at 33-34; Mesa Petroleum Co. v. Commissioner, 58 T.C. 374, 375
(1972). However, the notion of a royalty as an "economic interest" contemplates a right
to a share of production carved out of or given in exchange for an ownership or leasehold
interest in a mineral estate. See Palmer v. Bender, 287 U.S. at 557. Since a royalty interest
stems from its holder's exercise of his rights as "landowner," an obligation attributable
to the obligee's exercise of a non-landowner right, e.g., the right to tax, is not a royalty.
Although such a non-royalty obligation may possess the characteristics of a royalty as
defined by the case law under I.R.C. § 613, this similarity should not cause the non-
landowner obligation to be characterized as a royalty for foreign tax credit purposes.
71. While legal systems of property ownership in the United States recognize private
ownership of subsurface minerals, title to such minerals in most major oil-producing
countries is vested in the state. G. BRANNON, supra note 19, at 61 (1974). The uniqueness
of the American legal system suggests the inapplicability of domestic royalty cases to
levies exacted by foreign governments on mineral income.
72. New York & Honduras Rosario Mining Co. v. Commissioner, 168 F.2d 745 (2d Cir.
1948) (contractual obligation to pay 7 percent of mining profits to foreign government held
to be creditable foreign tax).
73. The characterization of the entire production-sharing obligation as a royalty is not
consistent with Rev. Rul. 72-579, 1972-2 C.B. 441, which held that a payment by a United
States employee to Great Britain pursuant to the National Insurance Act was a creditable
foreign income tax. This ruling suggests that the capacity in which a foreign government
exacts a levy (in Rev. Rul. 72-579, as "insurer") is not relevant to the creditability of that
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The second feature of the production-sharing obligation on which the
IRS based its ruling is Indonesia's contractual right to an assured share
of production without regard for the profitability of the contractor's
operations. The thrust of this argument is that, since the production-
sharing levy is not imposed on the contractor with an eye toward reach-
ing net gain, its obligation is not a tax but rather a royalty. This analysis
is inconsistent with a wealth of case law and revenue rulings which have
recognized levies which do not reach net gain as taxes.74
The final feature on which the IRS relied is the contractual provision
by which title to Indonesia's share of production always remains with
Indonesia. However, technical title to oil under a production-sharing
contract has little relevance to the substance of the economic arrange-
ment between the contractor and Indonesia. The provision concerning
title does not stem from the economic or financial motives of the con-
tracting parties; Indonesia insists upon this arrangement to create the
appearance that the country is acquiring greater control and supervision
over foreign oil companies.75 The economic and financial mechanics of
production-sharing operations would be the same if the terms of the
contract temporarily vested title to all profit oil in the contractor and
then obligated it to transfer the 70 percent share to Indonesia. Conse-
quently, Indonesia's retention of technical title does not indicate that
the entire levy is a royalty; rather, the economic substance of the
production-sharing contract suggests the presence of both tax and roy-
alty elements in the single production-sharing levy.7" By focusing on the
levy. A similar approach would allow a foreign tax credit for the entire Indonesian
production-sharing obligation. However, neither Rev. Rul. 72-579 nor Rev. Rul. 76-215
properly appreciate the significance which the foreign sovereign's capacity should be given
for foreign tax credit purposes. The IRS should scrutinize the nature of the foreign sover-
eign's revenue collecting activity if credit treatment is to be afforded, as I.R.C. § 901(b)
provides, for "income taxes," i.e. levies which stem from a sovereign's exercise of its
income taxation authority.
74. See cases cited at [1977] 2 STAND. FED. TAX REP. (CCH) 1451.245-.346. This
"assured share" feature does have significance for the foreign tax credit treatment of
the production-sharing contract in connection with the "imposed-on-income" require-
ment, not with the threshold "tax-royalty" issue. See note 95 infra and accompanying
text.
75. See note 44 supra.
76. Nordberg and Kelleher maintain that the contractor should receive a credit for the
amount which Pertamina deposits with the Indonesian Treasury, on the grounds that
Pertamina's discharge of this obligation constitutes satisfaction of the contractor's tax
liability by a third party. Nordberg & Kelleher, supra note 9 at 218. See Treas. Reg. §
1.61-14 (1956); Chicago, B. & Q.R.R. v. United States, 455 F.2d 993, 1019-23 (Ct. Cl.
1972), rev'd on other grounds, 412 U.S. 401 (1973) (per-diem related payment by American
railroad to Mexican railroads held creditable where Mexican railroads were obligated to
retain this payment to discharge the American railroad's Mexican income tax liability).
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contractor's legal rights to the exclusion of the underlying economic
realities, Revenue Ruling 76-215 is inconsistent with cases in other tax
contexts which have looked to economic substance rather than technical
legal title."
Moreover, the mechanism by which Indonesia exacts a percentage
share of oil does not differ in substance from the revenue-collecting
machinery by which other host countries exact levies from oil com-
panies operating under concession contracts for which credit treatment
is allowed. Under a concession contract, the oil company acquires title
to all production, makes a relatively small "royalty" payment, and is
free to sell its production to any contracting party. However, the con-
cessionaire must reserve a substantial percentage of its net profits,
often more than 50 percent, 8 for payment of income taxes to the host
See also Missouri Pac. R.R. v. United States, 497 F.2d 1386, 1394-95 (Ct. Cl. 1974).
Nordberg and Kelleher's contention does not recognize the close relationship between
Indonesia and Pertamina which makes it inappropriate to characterize Pertamina's de-
posit into the Treasury as payment of a tax. See note 83 infra. Rather, the contractor
should be deemed to discharge its tax liability by satisfaction of the production-sharing
obligation. See note 68 supra.
77. In Burnet v. Harmel, 287 U.S. 103 (1932), the Supreme Court held that an oil and
gas lease executed under Texas law was not a sale of a capital asset which would entitle
the lessor to capital gains treatment on bonuses and royalties received. Texas law differs
from the law of the majority of jurisdictions in that it gives the lessee present title to oil
and gas in place; under the majority rule, title is transferred to the lessee only upon
extraction. Although income derived from a lease under the majority rule is treated as
ordinary income for tax purposes, the lessor in Harmel argued that Texas law effects a
present exchange of a capital asset and thus requires that the lessor's income receive
capital gains treatment. The Court rejected this argument on the grounds that the eco-
nomic consequences to the lessor under each type of lease were the same and that income
derived from both leases should therefore receive similar tax treatment "irrespective of
any particular characterization of the payments in the local law." Id. at 110. See also West
v. Commissioner, 150 F.2d 723 (5th Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 795 (1946) (grantor
of entire surface and mineral estate held to receive ordinary income where the economic
substance of the transaction constituted an oil and gas lease with a reserved royalty to
the grantor). See generally Hambrick, Another Look at Some Old Problems-Percentage
Depletion and the ABC Transaction, 34 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 1, 15-17 (1965). Similar
reasoning requires that tax treatment of the Indonesian production-sharing obligation
turn on the economic substance of the relationship between the contractor and Indonesia.
Oil operators in the same economic posture vis-a-vis several different host sovereigns
should receive the same foreign tax credit treatment for levies which are substantially
similar, regardless of the particular property rights which each operator may enjoy under
the local law of each host sovereign. Cf. Commissioner v. Southwest Exploration Co., 350
U.S. 208 (1956) (taxpayer who never acquired a proprietary interest in an adjacent tract
but who granted an easement over his own land to the adjacent operator in return for a
share of the net profits acquired an "economic interest" in the minerals covered by the
adjacent tract for percentage depletion purposes).
78. The major Middle East oil producing countries impose varying rates of income
taxation. Saudi Arabia taxes foreign oil companies at 85 percent of net profit. Interna-
tional Bureau of Fiscal Documentation, Conference Manual for Tax and Legal Aspects of
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country.79 The practical result is substantially the same as that achieved
under the Indonesian production-sharing contract."0 The object of the
host government in both instances is to secure a share of the contractor's
net production; the fact that Indonesia receives its share directly from
the contractor rather than indirectly through a levy denominated as an
"income tax" should not lead to inequitable United States tax conse-
quences."'
2. Allocation of Tax and Royalty
The ruling's classification of the entire levy as a royalty leads to the
highly unlikely conclusion that Indonesia, as taxing sovereign, has re-
frained from exercising its taxing power on petroleum operations. On the
other hand, classifying the entire levy as a tax would imply that Indone-
Trade and Investment in Oil Countries and Financial Centres of the Middle East, at Saudi
Arabia 11 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Conference Manual]. Iran imposes a progressive
income tax with a maximum rate of 68.35 percent on income over $2,852,000 for retained
profits and dividends to holders of bearer shares, and 73.35 percent for dividends to
overseas holders of registered shares. Id. at Iran 4, 6. Iraq imposes a special income tax
for petroleum companies at a flat rate of 50 percent on income from projects started before
Nov. 14, 1970, and 55 percent for subsequent projects. Id. at Iraq 6. Abu Dhabi imposes a
progressive income tax only upon foreign oil companies and certain other foreign owned
companies, with a maximum rate of 50 percent on all income above $1,250,000. PEAT,
MARWICK, MrrcHELL & Co., TAXATION AND OTHER COMMERcIAL LEGISLATION IN SELECTED
CouNms OF THE MIDDLE EAST 42 (1976). Outar taxes oil companies at an 85 percent rate.
Conference Manual, supra at Outar 3.
79. Note, From Concession to Participation: Restructuring the Middle East Oil
Industry, 48 N.Y.U.L. REv. 774, 776-77 (1973). In recent years, host countries, which have
insisted on greater participation in petroleum operations, have eroded exclusive produc-
tion management and ownership rights which characterize the traditional concession
contract. See generally Brenscheidt, Petroleum Legislation in the North Sea Countries,
11 TEX. INT'L L.J. 281 (1976); Note, From Concession to Participation: Restructuring
the Middle East Oil Industry, 48 N.Y.U.L. REV. 774 (1973). Some host countries have in-
sisted on "participation" agreements, whereby the host country acquires ownership to a
share of the oil company's concession, together with a proportionate share of the oil
produced. Note, supra, at 793-99. While the contractual agreements concerning the host's
share of production differ substantially from the concession arrangement, the terms under
which the oil company acquires its share, the "equity" oil, continue to reflect the economic
substance of the concession contract. See note 115 supra.
80. After comparing the different features of traditional concession contracts with
production-sharing contracts, Fabrikant states: "On the basis of empirical investigation,
it is reasonable to conclude that the operational differences between production-sharing
and concession contracts [is] insubstantial .... [ihe operational and legal significance
of [provisions relating to title] appears to be minimal. . ." Pertamina Analysis, supra
note 41, at 535-36. For an analysis of the production-sharing contract as a disguised
concession contract, see Indonesian Petroleum Industry, supra note 44, at 334-41.
81. See Nordberg & Kelleher, supra note 9, at 222.
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sia, as landowner, permits foreign contractors to remove its valuable
minerals free of charge. 2
Proper tax treatment should recognize that the production-sharing
obligation is neither a tax nor a royalty in its entirety, but is exacted in
a simultaneous exercise of Indonesia's taxation authority and landowner
rights." The production-sharing obligation is comprised of both tax and
royalty charges; consequently, its dual character should be reflected in
tax treatment which pierces the form of Indonesia's revenue-collecting
machinery and allocates the single levy into its two separate compo-
nents for foreign tax credit purposes.Y After studying the economics of
82. Under this "tax" classification, the contractor does not extract minerals entirely
without charge, since most contracts entitle Indonesia to a production bonus when produc-
tion reaches a certain level. See note 49 supra. The production bonus should be considered
an additional "tax/royalty" obligation exacted by Indonesia in its dual capacity as taxing
authority and royalty-collecting landowner; for foreign tax credit purposes, it should be
examined independently of the production-sharing obligation. It should not be viewed as
the only royalty charge imposed by Indonesia, because few private landowners would agree
to wait until production reaches a specified level before receiving any royalty payments.
Furthermore, some contracts do not oblige the contractor to pay a production bonus.
83. See E. OWENS, supra note 20, at 33; Comment, supra note 4, at 447. Since Pertamina
and the Indonesian Treasury split Indonesia's share of profit oil, and because the Indone-
sian Treasury issues a "tax receipt" upon Pertamina's deposit of 60 percent of the profit
oil into the Treasury, see Indonesian Petroleum Industry, supra note 44, at 326, Nordberg
and Kelleher maintain that the share received by the Indonesian Treasury is a tax and
that the share received by Pertamina is a royalty or "net profits interest." Nordberg &
Kelleher, supra note 9, at 219. This view fails to recognize that the character of Perta-
mina's share of oil revenues does not differ in substance from the oil revenues which the
Indonesian Treasury receives and distributes to various other governmental branches and
and operations. While other branches of the government receive oil revenues indirectly
through the Treasury, Pertamina is allowed to retain its share in advance. Under the
mechanics of this system of revenue distribution, the share which Pertamina retains is
no more a royalty than is the distributive share which any other arm of the Indonesian
government receives. Indonesia has not transferred to Pertamina its right as landowner
to collect royalties but has allocated a share of total government revenues to the wholly-
owned state petroleum enterprise. The precise amount of this share has no relation to the
portion of the contractor's production-sharing obligation which actually compensates In-
donesia for the extracation of its minerals. Cf. Chicago, B. & Q.R.R. Co. v. United States,
455 F.2d 993, 1023 (Ct. Cl. 1972), rev'd on other grounds, 412 U.S. 401 (1973) (distribution
of collected tax revenues within a foreign country is irrelevant to the foreign tax credit
treatment of foreign levies).
84. The courts in other contexts have recognized the appropriateness of apportioning a
single obligation into separate portions for tax purposes. See Commissioner v. Ferrer, 304
F.2d 125 (2d Cir. 1962) (single payment received for surrender of certain rights in a play
allocated into two portions, one portion representing the amount received in exchange for
the taxpayer's "capital assets" in the play, the second portion representing the amount
received for surrender of the taxpayer's "compensation" rights for services to be rendered
in producing the play). See also Helvering v. Taylor, 293 U.S. 507 (1935); Ditmars v.
Commissioner, 302 F.2d 481 (2d Cir. 1962); Meister v. Commissioner, 302 F.2d 54 (2d Cir.
1962); Webster Investors, Inc. v. Commissioner, 291 F.2d 192 (2d Cir. 1961).
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oil production in Indonesia and other host countries, the IRS should
formulate a scheme to divide the single levy into tax and royalty por-
tions corresponding to the separate amounts which would have been
exacted as independent tax and royalty charges." The contractor would
exclude the royalty portion from his gross income and, if the tax portion
satisfied either the "imposed-on-income" or "in lieu" requirements of
sections 901 and 903, s1 credit the tax portion against its United States
tax liability.9 This tax treatment would reflect the extent to which the
production-sharing obligation is traceable to Indonesia's exercise of its
85. Nordberg and Kelleher suggest that the domestic obligation, see note 52 supra,
should be treated as a royalty obligation. Nordberg & Kelleher, supra note 9, at 219. If
the contractor were to adopt this view, it could argue against an allocation scheme and
insist that the Indonesian tax consists of the entire production-sharing obligation. Alterna-
tively, the contractor could argue that the tax consists of the 60 percent share of the profit
oil deposited in the Indonesian Treasury, and that Indonesia collects two royalties: the
domestic obligation and Pertamina's share of the production-sharing obligation. But see
note 83 supra. Rather than distinguish between the royalty and tax exactions with refer-
ence to these formal, technical distinctions, the allocation approach suggests that the
domestic obligation should be added to the production-sharing obligation and the total
amount allocated into tax and royalty portions on the basis of the economic realities of
the production-sharing setting.
86. See notes 23-33 supra and accompanying text.
87. Assuming that the tax portion is found to be creditable, the contractor's Indonesian
extraction income for United States tax purposes is the entire amount of profit oil less






Total profit oil 100
The contractor's ioreigu extraction income is the total profit oil (100) less the royalty (25),
or 75. Assuming a United States corporate tax rate of 48 percent, the contractor incurs a
United States tax liability of .48 x 75, or 36. However, the contractor is eligible for the
foreign tax credit for income taxes paid to Indonesia, subject to the limitation provisions
of § 1035(c)(2) of the Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455,90 Stat. 1631, reprinted
in I.R.C. § 907 note. See notes 37-39 supra and accompanying text. The contractor there-
fore receives a foreign tax credit in an amount which equals the United States corporate
tax rate (48 percent) multiplied by his foreign extraction income from Indonesia (75), or
36. The contractor's United States tax liability (36) is offset entirely by the maximum
allowable credit (36), but the excess of Indonesian income taxes over the maximum allow-
able credit (45 - 39 = 9) is neither creditable nor deductible in computing the con-
tractor's total taxable income from its worldwide operations.
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taxing authority and would avoid the double international taxation of
income.
One obstacle to this allocation scheme is IR-1638, 8 which interprets
the foreign tax credit provisions as prohibiting allocation of a single levy
into tax and royalty portions. This interpretation, however, finds no
support in the case law. 9 Moreover, an examination of the legislative
history" of sections 901 and 903 reveals that Congress did not consider
the application of the foreign tax credit provisions to a single tax/royalty
levy exacted by foreign government/landlords91 In the absence of legis-
lative direction, the IRS should apply these sections to the production-
sharing contract in a manner consistent with the rationale behind the
foreign tax credit; the single levy should be allocated.
B. THE PRODUCTION-SHARING OBLIGATION AS AN "IN LIEU" TAX
The tax portion of the production-sharing obligation will qualify for
the foreign tax credit if it is imposed on income within the meaning of
section 901 or imposed in lieu of an otherwise generally applicable in-
come tax as provided by section 903.
A foreign tax is creditable under section 901 only if it is imposed with
an eye towards reaching the taxpayer's net gain and is very unlikely to
fall on the taxpayer when his operations are not profitable.92 Under this
88. IR-1638, supra note 17.
89. No court has considered whether a single payment may be split into separate tax
and royalty parts for foreign tax credit purposes. Moreover, the IRS refusal to allow
allocation is inconsistent with Biddle v. Commissioner, 302 U.S. 573, 578-79 (1938), where
the Supreme Court declared that foreign tax credit treatment should look behind the form
of a foreign levy and determine creditability with a view to the substance of the charge,
according to United States principles of foreign tax classification. Since a portion of the
contractor's production-sharing obligation is traceable to Indonesia's taxing power, the
presence of a tax should be recognized for foreign tax credit purposes, regardless of the
"tax/royalty" form in which the contractor is obligated to pay it.
90. H.R. REP. No. 767, 65th Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1918); S. REP. No. 617, 65th Cong., 3d
Sess. 31 (1918); H.R. REP. No. 1037, 65th Cong., 3d Sess. 10, 53-54 (1919); S. REP. No.
1631, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 131-32 (1942); H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 76-77
(1954); S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 104-05 (1954); H.R. REP. No. 2543, 83d
Cong., 2d Sess. 68 (1954).
91. No foreign charges of this "tax/royalty" rature were levied at the time the foreign
tax credit provisions were enacted.
92. Bank of America Nat'l Trust & Savs. Ass'n v. United States, 459 F.2d 513, 523 (Ct.
Cl.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 949 (1972). This standard for determining creditability under
I.R.C. § 901 is less restrictive than the criteria of the less recent cases which required that
the foreign tax base roughly approximate taxable income according to United States
income taxation principles. See note 26 supra. The inconsistency between the two stan-
dards under I.R.C. § 901 does not affect the tax treatment afforded the tax portion of
production-sharing obligations, since the tax will not satisfy the more restrictive standard
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test, the production-sharing obligation does not qualify for credit treat-
ment. Because each contract limits recoverable costs to 40 percent of
total production under each contract" and denies recovery for costs
incurred under other contracts held by the contractor,94 Indonesia is
entitled to an assured share of production whether or not the contrac-
tor's operations are profitable. 5 Although net losses may occur infre-
quently, the possibility that the contractor might have to discharge a
if it does not meet the more liberal standard. Therefore, only the less restrictive standard
need be considered.
93. The method of cost recovery has been recently revised to allow the contractors to
amortize capital expenditures and noncapital expenses over a 7 to 14 year period. Wall
St. J., Oct. 12, 1976, at 4, col. 2; Original Terms of Reference, supra note 18. For capital
expenditures, this recovery method should satisfy the fifth guideline of IR-1638, supra note
17. However, the revised terms provide that noncapital costs, while "considered to be
currently recoverable," can be actually recovered only over a 10 year period, with interest
of 8 percent on the unpaid balance. Original Terms of Reference, supra note 18. Since the
contract continues to subject the contractor to the production-sharing obligation in a loss
year, this method of noncapital cost recovery does not meet the requirements of R-1638;
consequently, the revised contracts will not allow foreign tax credit treatment under the
current IRS approach.
94. The fourth guideline in IR-1638, supra note 17, requires that the contractor's foreign
tax liability be computed on the basis of its entire extraction operations within the foreign
country. The contractors have attempted to negotiate with Indonesia for the revision of
the contracts to conform to the guideline, but Indonesia thus far has refused to agree to a
consolidation of contracts for the purpose of computing each contractor's production-
sharing obligation. Original Terms of Reference, supra note 18. Since Indonesia continues
to insist that the contractor bear all the risks of exploration and development, revision of
the contracts along the lines of the fourth guideline is unlikely.
To avoid the consolidation requirement in the guidelines; an American oil company
might establish (or be required by Indonesia to establish) separate subsidiary corpora-
tions, each of which would acquire one contract. In form, this device would create a
separate taxable entity for each contract, the gain from which would constitute the subsid-
iary's entire income from its Indonesian operations. However, the IRS might regard the
creation of these subsidiaries as a sham and recognize the parent as the only taxable entity
for the separate operations of its subsidiaries.
95. See note 64 supra and accompanying text. Although the IRS incorrectly objected
to these "assured share" features on the threshold "tax-royalty" issue, the presence of this
feature does prevent credit treatment under I.R.C. § 901 on the second issue, the
"imposed-on-income" requirement. The provision limiting maximum cost recovery enti-
tles Indonesia to an assured share regardless of whether the contractor produces enough
oil to recover its costs. The contractor's signature and production bonus obligations, and
nonrecoverable interest expenses further increase the likelihood that the contractor may
incur a production-sharing obligation when it does not realize a profit. See note 49 supra.
Moreover, the provision requiring separate production-sharing computation for each con-
tract assures Indonesia a share of production from a contractor holding several contracts,
some in the production stage, and others in which substantial exploration expenditures
have been made but no oil has been discovered. Despite expenditures under the unproduc-
tive contracts which are greater than profit under the productive contracts, the contractor
would nonetheless incur production-sharing obligations under the productive contracts.
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production-sharing obligation when its operations are unprofitable dis-
qualifies the production-sharing tax from credit treatment under section
901.
Unlike a section 901 tax, a section 903 tax need not be directed at net
gain to be creditable." The IRS has interpreted the "in lieu" provision
to allow credit treatment for a substituted tax which satisfies three
requirements: (1) the foreign country has in force a general income tax;
(2) the taxpayer would be subject to the general income tax in the
absence of the substituted tax; and (3) the general income tax is not
imposed upon the taxpayer."
The first requirement is easily satisfied; a prior revenue ruling" has
held that the Indonesian Corporation Tax is a general income tax. Simi-
larly, the second requirement is met because Indonesian law provides
that the contractor remains liable for the Corporation Tax until the
Indonesian Treasury receives its share of profit oil. The third require-
ment, however, poses a problem. Article 15 of the Pertamina Law99
provides that the contractor's Corporation Tax liability is discharged
only when the Indonesian Treasury receives its 60 percent share from
Pertamina. Consequently, it might be argued that the tax portion of the
production-sharing obligation is a non-creditable additional, rather
than a substituted, tax, since Pertamina might fail to make this deposit
and leave the contractor liable for the general income tax. In situations
where the contractor is held liable for both the production-sharing obli-
gation and the general income tax, this argument has merit. However,
96. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. United States, 375 F.2d 835, 838-39 (Ct. Cl. 1967). The
court expressly rejected the IRS's contention that I.R.C. § 903 applies only to "empiri-
cal" income taxes, i.e. taxes aimed solely at net income but using a simplified formula to
calculate the tax. Id. at 837.
97. Treas. Reg. § 1.903-1, T.D. 6780, 1965-1 C.B. 105. See note 33 supra. The IRS has
indicated that the requirements which IR-1638 promulgated for I.R.C. § 901 do not apply
to I.R.C. § 903. IR-1638, supra note 17. The regulations do not require that the "in lieu"
tax be a substitute for the general income tax alone; consequently, the fact that the
production-sharing obligation relieves the contractor of other tax liabilities in addition to
the general income tax should not affect its creditability under I.R.C. § 903. See note 56
supra and accompanying text. But since these additional taxes are not imposed on in-
come, proper tax treatment requires that, before allocation, the production-sharing obliga-
tion be decreased by the amount which the contractor would otherwise have been sepa-
rately charged for these additional taxes.
98. Rev. Rul. 69-388, 1969-2 C.B. 154. The ruling held that credit treatment under
I.R.C. § 903 was available for a tax paid to Indonesia pursuant to a contract between the
taxpayer and Indonesia which provided that the taxpayer's tax liability was to be calcu-
lated by a method different than that under the Corporation Tax. To reach that conclu-
sion, the IRS necessarily found that the Corporation Tax is a general income tax, in
accordance with Treas. Reg. § 1.903-1(a), T.D. 6780, 1965-1 C.B. 96.
99. PERTAMINA LAw, Law No. 8, art. 15, [1971] LN (1971).
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speculation about what might occur should not affect the tax status of
those contractors whose Corporation Tax liability has been discharged
by the Treasury's receipt of its share of profit oil. Multiple taxation of
this kind has not occurred in Indonesia and is unlikely in the future.,0
Nevertheless, if this situation should arise, credit should be given only
after Pertamina deposits the 60 percent share into the Indonesian Treas-
ury, or after the Indonesian government has indicated that the contrac-
tor will not be held liable for the Corporation Tax.
IV
A PROPOSED SCHEME OF ALLOCATION
However theoretically sound the justification for allocation may be,
allocation is desirable only if a workable method of computing the sepa-
rate tax and royalty portions can be formulated.'"' The division of the
production-sharing obligation must accurately reflect the economic
realities of the entire transaction between Indonesia and the contractors,
so that the creditable tax portion will approximate the amount which
would have been paid as a tax had Indonesia elected to collect its reve-
nues by separate tax and royalty exactions."0 ' This allocation scheme
should also apply to United States oil companies operating abroad
under concession contracts.
A. THE REASONABLE INCOME TAX RATE
A contractor's production-sharing obligation should be allocated on
the basis of a reasonable income tax rate. Subject to the limitation
provisions,' 3 the amount of the production-sharing obligation eligible
for foreign tax credit treatment should equal the reasonable income tax
100. For a general discussion of the contractor's potential liability for the Corporation
Tax upon Pertamina's default, see Indonesian Petroleum Industry, supra note 44 at 323-
30. Although Pertamina has recently withheld the Treasury's share to satisfy its enormous
debts, the Indonesian government is unlikely to risk the damage which multiple taxation
would inflict on its relationship with the contractors. See Grant, supra note 41, at 3;
Indonesian Petroleum Industry, supra note 44, at 329-30. Fear of multiple taxation might
induce many contractors to decrease their level of operations or terminate operations
entirely. Since Indonesia's projected future revenues depend largely on production-sharing
obligations, it can ill-afford this risk.
101. The contractor's liability for the production bonus has no bearing on the computa-
tion of the separate tax and royalty portions of the production-sharing obligation. See
note 82 supra.
102. A contractor who challenges Rev. Rul. 76-215 or IR-1638 will stand in a stronger
position if he is armed with a relatively precise formula for allocation which reflects the
economic substance of the contractor's relationship with Indonesia.
103. See notes 34-39 supra and accompanying text.
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rate multiplied by the sum of the contractor's share of profit oil plus the
income tax portion of the levy.104 The balance of the production-sharing
obligation would constitute the royalty portion and would be excluded
from the contractor's gross income for United States tax purposes.
The reasonable income tax rate should approximate the tax rate
which would have been imposed on the contractor if the host country
had exacted separately computed tax and royalty charges.15 However,
the reasonable income tax rate should not be based solely on the foreign
sovereign's general income tax rate; apportionment of the production-
sharing obligation should take into account the profitability of the con-
tractor's operations. ' Since landowners generally exact a higher royalty
from production operations where a high rate of profitability is ex-
pected,' 7 the IRS should treat a greater percentage of the production-
sharing obligation as a royalty where production costs are relatively low
and profits high. In this situation, the reasonable income tax rate should
be lower than the general income tax rate.' 5 Conversely, less profitable
104. Mathematically, this formula is expressed as follows:
Let P - contractor's share of profit oil
R = reasonable income tax rate
X -- portions of the production-sharing
obligation allocated to the "tax" portion.
X= (R) X (P + X)
X= (R) (P) + (R) (X)
X- (R) (X) = (R) (P)
X (1-R) - (R) (P)
X = (R) (P)
1-R
Assuming a reasonable income tax rate of 60 percent and that the contractor's share of
profit oil is 30, the tax portion shall be[(.60) X (3)] -[1 - .60] = 45. The difference
between Indonesia's total share (70) and the tax portion (45) would constitute the royalty
portion (25). See note 87 supra.
105. The Indonesian Corporation Tax imposes an income tax rate of 56 percent, which
falls within the range of income tax rates imposed by the major oil producing Middle East
countries (50 to 85 percent). Nordberg & Kelleher, supra note 9, at 220; see note 78 supra.
The income tax rates imposed by host countries upon North Sea oil production are gener-
ally lower, in the range of 40 to 50 percent. See generally Brenscheidt, supra note 79.
106. For allocation purposes, profit should be measured by gross profit per barrel, which
is the market price less cost of production, not including the royalty and income tax
charges.
107. See G. BRANNON, supra note 19, at 61-62.
108. The integration of factors into a mathematically weighted formula involves eco-
nomic analysis which is beyond the scope of this Note. It should be observed, however,
that the formulation of the reasonable income tax rate would not impose an undue burden
on the IRS. Although the IRS would have to stay abreast of the economics of oil production
in foreign countries and the intricacies of foreign taxation schemes, this administrative
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operations should be assigned a lower royalty rate and a correspondingly
higher income tax rate.' 9
B. APPLICATION TO CONCESSION CONTRACTS
This allocation scheme should also be applied to levies imposed on
American oil companies operating abroad under traditional concession
contracts."' Although the foreign host government typically imposes
separately stated tax and royalty charges on the concessionaire, the
"income tax" charge may not accurately reflect the portion of the con-
cessionaire's total obligation traceable to the sovereign's exercise of its
taxing authority. In order to accommodate the tax desires of American
oil companies,"' a host government may exact the royalty charge at a
responsibility would not significantly increase the extensive administrative activity in
which the IRS is currently engaged with respect to corporate taxpayers' foreign extraction
income. Comment, supra note 4, at 447. The equitable tax treatment which allocation
offers is well worth a slight addition to this administrative burden.
109. Although this allocation scheme may not provide an exact formula for apportion-
ing the tax and royalty portions, this scheme is preferable to tax treatment which charac-
terizes the entire obligation as one or the other. In Commissioner v. Ferrer, 304 F.2d 125
(2d Cir. 1962), Judge Friendly directed allocation of a single contractual obligation for tax
purposes and stated:
In such instances, where part of a transaction calls for one tax treatment and
another for a different kind, allocation is demanded .... If it be said that to
remand for this purpose is asking the Tax Court to separate the inseparable, we
answer that no one expects scientific exactness; that however roughly hewn the
decision may be, the result is certain to be fairer than either extreme; and that
similar tasks must be performed by the Tax Court in other areas.
Id. at 135. See note 84 supra.
110. See notes 78-79 supra and accompanying text. Similarly, the allocation scheme
should apply to production-sharing contracts which may be revised to obligate the con-
tractor to discharge separately stated royalty and income tax levies. See note 18 supra.
111. See Cox & Wright, supra note 22, at 825-26. American oil companies will pay lower
United States income taxes if the foreign government splits its total charge into a rela-
tively high income tax and a relatively low royalty. The following table illustrates the
United States tax differential for two countries which each exact $50 from a taxpayer
whose net production (less royalties and income tax) is $100:
Country A Country B
Royaltv 20 10




U.S. income tax without
credit
Less: credit for foreign
income taxes
U.S. income tax
at 32.5% = 30 at 44.5% = 40
50 50
80 90
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low rate not commensurate with the value of the concession and impose
a relatively high rate of income taxation. Proper tax treatment should
recognize that part of the charge which such a revenue collection scheme
denominates as an "income tax" is actually a disguised royalty
charge."' Foreign tax credit treatment should reflect the economic sub-
stance of the concessionare's tax and royalty obligations and allow credit
only for that portion which constitutes a true income tax."1 The reason-
able income tax rate' approach suggested for production-sharing con-
tracts should be used to determine the creditable amount."'
Thus, the taxpayer pays $5.2 more in United States taxes on income from country A for
every $100 of revenue than he pays on his income from country B. American oil companies
have in the past influenced host countries to adopt the revenue-collecting scheme repre-
sented by country B in order to obtain more favorable United States tax treatment. See
Comment, supra note 4, at 429.
112. IR-1638 indicates that the IRS intends only to allow a deduction for foreign income
taxes which contain a disguised royalty portion. IR-1638, supra note 17, at 71,670. Such
tax treatment would impose an inequitably heavy tax burden on those taxpayers paying
levies denominated as income taxes but not recognized as creditable by the IRS.
113. Congress has already enacted legislation which addresses the foreign tax credit
afforded incomhe taxes calculated on the basis of a posted price. I.R.C. § 907(d) provides
that foreign extraction income is determined by the fair market value of the oil produced
rather than by the higher posted price. Because this valuation method decreases foreign
extraction income, the foreign tax credit allowable under the limitation provisions is
reduced correspondingly. See notes 34-39 supra and accompanying text. The amount of
foreign tax eliminated from the foreign tax credit by I.R.C. § 907(d) is not deductible as
a tax under I.R.C. § 164(a)(3). See note 4 supra. However, some or all of this "tax" amount
should be excludable from gross income if it actually constitutes a disguised royalty
payment. But regardless of this royalty exclusion, I.R.C. § 907(d) evidences legislative
intent not to deny the foreign tax credit completely when the foreign taxation scheme
generates excessive foreign income taxes which do not precisely reflect the economic
realities underlying the taxpayer's relationship with the host government.
114. The fact that a host country may exact royalties in the form of a levy on gross
rather than net production does not affect the applicability of the allocation scheme,
provided that the tax portion satisfies the requirements of I.R.C. § § 901, 903. Where the
gross royalty rate in a particular country is found to be unreasonably low, the allocation
scheme may be adjusted to apportion the tax and royalty revenues on the basis of a royalty
calculated upon net rather than gross production.
115. The applicability of the allocation scheme to concession contracts is not prevented
by I.R.C. § 901(f), which denies foreign tax credit treatment for a levy paid in connection
with the purchase or sale of oil if: (a) the taxpayer does not have an economic interest in
the oil; and (b) the price differs from the fair market value. The legislative history of this
provision indicates that it is intended to apply only to "buyback" oil. 121 CONG. REC.
S5246 (daily ed. Mar. 26, 1975) (remarks of Sen. Long). See S. REP. No. 938, 94th Cong.,
2d Sess. 251 (1976). "Buyback" oil refers to the share of oil to which the host government
retains title under a participation agreement permitting or requiring the oil company to
purchase this oil when the host government's marketing efforts fail. Yager & Steinberg,
Trends in the International Oil Market, in IGHR OIL PcFs AND THE WORLD ECONOMY
227, 233 (E. Fried & C. Schultze eds. 1975). See note 79 supra. I.R.C. § 901(f) disallows
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CONCLUSION
Revenue Ruling 76-215 fails to treat the production-sharing obligation
in a manner which reflects the economic realities of the relationship
between the contractor and Indonesia. The characterization of the entire
obligation as a royalty is not supported by the reasoning set forth by the
IRS in the ruling and produces inequitable tax treatment of taxpayers
in substantially similar economic positions. Proper tax treatment
should allocate the production-sharing obligation into separate tax and
royalty portions for foreign tax credit purposes. This allocation scheme
would afford credit treatment for the portion of the production-sharing
obligation attributable to Indonesia's income taxation authority and
exclude from the contractor's gross income the portion traceable to its
exercise of landowner rights. This tax treatment would properly reflect
the substance of the production-sharing relationship and provide tax
equity between concessionaires and production-sharing contractors.
Hollis Forbes Russell
credit for foreign "income taxes" upon the oil company's subsequent resale of this buyback
oil if the host government establishes an artifically inflated posted price upon which the
income tax on the resale is calculated.
"Equity" oil, to which the oil company acquires title upon production, is not covered
by I.R.C. § 901(f), even though the host government may require the calculation of the
income tax at a posted price which does not reflect the market value of the oil produced.
See Tannenbaum, supra note 6, at 23. Consequently, the "income taxes" on equity oil
production leved by Saudi Arabia and other Middle Eastern countries shotild be eligible
for the foreign tax credit under an allocation scheme to the extent that these "income
taxes" do not constitute disguised royalty charges. But see Comment, supra note 19, at
1066-67.
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